判断力批判(英文版)(精)/世界学术经典
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作者(德)伊曼努尔·康德
出版社上海译文出版社
ISBN9787532790388
出版时间2022-11
装帧精装
开本32开
定价158元
货号31591289
上书时间2024-06-29
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作者简介
"【作者简介】：
作者简介：伊曼努尔·康德(Immanuel Kant, 1724-1804)，西方近代哲学的核心人物。他综合了近代早期哲学的经验主义与理性主义，为19世纪和20世纪的大部分哲学奠定了基础，直到今天，康德哲学在形而上学、认识论、伦理学、政治哲学、美学以及其他领域仍有着重要影响。
导读注释者：张进，广东外语外贸大学教授。李日容，博士，广东外语外贸大学外国文学文化研究中心研究员。"
目录
\"【目录】：
导 读
— 001 —
PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION, 1790
— 001 —
INTRODUCTION
— 007 —
I On the Division of Philosophy
— 007 —
II On the Domain of Philosophy in General
— 011 —
III On the Critique of Judgment as Mediating the Connection of the Two Parts of Philosophy to [Form] a Whole
— 015 —
IV On Judgment as a Power That Legislates A Priori
— 018 —
V The Principle of the Formal Purposiveness of Nature Is a Transcendental Principle of Judgment
— 021 —
VI On the Connection of the Feeling of Pleasure with the Concept of the Purposiveness of Nature
— 028 —
VII On the Aesthetic Presentation of the Purposiveness of Nature
— 031 —
VIII On the Logical Presentation of the Purposiveness of Nature
— 035 —
IX How Judgment Connects the Legislations of the Understanding and of Reason
— 038 —
Part I Critique of Aesthetic Judgment
— 043 —
Part II Critique of Teleological Judgment
— 233 —
First Introduction to the Critique of Judgment
— 397 —
术语汇编与简释
— 461 —\"
内容摘要
\"【内容简介】：《判断力批判》可分为三大部分：“序言·导言”“审美判断力批判”和“目的论判断力批判”。在书中，康德寻求两个分割的世界的沟通，认为自由的道德律令要在感性的现实世界实现出来，其中介是反思判断力。既带知性性质，又带理性性质，从特殊去寻求普遍的反思判断力按照“自然合目的性”来沟通认识与道德两大领域，实现自然界的必然王国与道德界的自由王国的和谐，康德在认识论和伦理学之间建构一反思判断，最终完成了其先验论哲学体系。《判断力批判》出版后受到整个欧洲哲学界、美学界的重视，对费希特、席勒、谢林、叔本华等人都产生过深刻影响，是德国古典美学的奠基著作。
导读注释者在英文原版的基础上进行导读、注释，并增加了术语汇编和简释，帮助读者扫除阅读障碍，更好地理解书中的内容。\"
主编推荐
"【编辑推荐】：
《判断力批判》是德国古典美学的奠基著作，出版后受到整个欧洲哲学界、美学界的重视，对费希特、席勒、谢林、叔本华等人都产生过深刻影响。"
精彩内容
\"【精彩书摘】：IOntheDivisionofPhilosophyInsofarasphilosophycontainsprinciplesfortherationalcognitionofthingsthroughconcepts(andnotmerely,aslogicdoes,principlesoftheformofthoughtingeneralwithoutdistinctionofobjects),itisusuallydividedintotheoreticalandpractical.Thatdivisionisentirelycorrect,providedthereisalsoadifferenceinkindbetweentheconceptsthatassigntotheprinciplesofthisrationalcognitiontheirrespectiveobjects:otherwisetheconceptswouldnotjustifyadivision,sinceadivisionpresupposesthattheprinciplesoftherationalcognitionpertainingtothedifferentpartsofascienceareopposedtooneanother.Thereare,however,onlytwokindsofconcepts,which[thus]allowfortwodifferentprinciplesconcerningthepossibilityoftheirrespectiveobjects.Thesearetheconceptsofnatureandtheconceptoffreedom.Conceptsofnaturemakepossibleatheoreticalcognitiongovernedbyaprioriprinciples,whereastheveryconceptoffreedomcarrieswithit,asfarasnatureisconcerned,onlyanegativeprinciple(namely,ofmereopposition),butgivesrisetoexpansiveprinciplesforthedeterminationofthewill,whicharethereforecalledpractical;hencewearerighttodividephilosophyintotwopartsthatarequitedifferentintheirprinciples:theoreticalornaturalphilosophy,andpracticalormoralphilosophy(moralityisthetermweuseforreason’spracticallegislationgovernedbytheconceptoffreedom).Inthepast,however,thesetermshavebeenbadlymisusedfordividingthedifferentprinciplesandalongwiththemphilosophy.Fornodistinctionwasmadebetweenthepracticalgovernedbyconceptsofnatureandthepracticalgovernedbytheconceptoffreedom,withtheresultthatthesameterms,theoreticalandpracticalphilosophy,wereusedtomakeadivisionthatinfactdidnotdivideanything(sincethetwopartsmighthavethesamekindofprinciples).Forthewill,asthepowerofdesire,isoneofthemanynaturalcausesintheworld,namely,theonethatactsinaccordancewithconcepts;andwhateverwethinkofaspossible(ornecessary)throughawillwecallpracticallypossible(ornecessary),asdistinguishedfromthephysicalpossibilityornecessityofaneffectwhosecauseisnotdeterminedto[exercise]itscausalitythroughconcepts(butthroughmechanism,asinthecaseoflifelessmatter,orthroughinstinct,asinthecaseofanimals).Itishere,concerningthepractical,thatpeopleleaveitundeterminedwhethertheconceptthatgivestheruletothewill’scausalityisaconceptofnatureoraconceptoffreedom.Yetthisdistinctionisessential.Foriftheconceptthatdetermines[theexerciseof]thecausalityisaconceptofnature,thentheprincipleswillbetechnicallypractical;butifitisaconceptoffreedom,thentheprincipleswillbemorallypractical.Andsincethedivisionofarationalscience[-wissenschaft]dependsentirelyonthatdifferencebetweentherespectiveobjectswhichrequiresdifferentprinciplesfor[their]cognition,thetechnicallypracticalprincipleswillbelongtotheoreticalphilosophy(naturalscience[-lehre]),whilethemorallypracticalonesalonewillformthesecondpart,practicalphilosophy(moraltheory[-lehre]).Alltechnicallypracticalrules(i.e.,thoseofartandofskillingeneral,orforthatmatterofprudence,i.e.,skillininfluencingpeople’svolition),insofarastheirprinciplesrestonconcepts,mustbeincludedonlyintheoreticalphilosophy,ascorollaries.Fortheyconcernnothingbutthepossibilityofthingsaccordingtoconceptsofnature;andthisincludesnotonlythemeanswefindinnatureforproducingthem,buteventhewill(aspowerofdesireandhenceasanaturalpower),asfarasitcanbedetermined,inconformitywiththementionedrules,bynaturalincentives.However,suchpracticalrulesarenotcalledlaws(asare,e.g.,physicallaws),butonlyprecepts.Thisisbecausethewillissubjectnotmerelytotheconceptofnature,butalsototheconceptoffreedom;anditisinrelationtothelatterthatthewill’sprinciplesarecalledlaws.Onlytheselatterprinciples,alongwithwhatfollowsfromthem,formthesecond,i.e.,thepractical,partofphilosophy.Thepointisthis:Solvingtheproblemsofpuregeometrydoesnotbelongtoaspecialpartofgeometry,nordoestheartoflandsurveyingdeservethenameofpracticalgeometry(asdistinctfrompure),asasecondpartofgeometryingeneral.Butitwouldbeequallywrong,evenmoreso,toconsidertheartofexperimentationorobservationinmechanicsorchemistrytobeapracticalpartofnaturalscience,or,finally,toincludeanyofthefollowinginpracticalphilosophy,letaloneregardthemasconstitutingthesecondpartofphilosophyingeneral:domestic,agricultural,orpoliticaleconomy,theartofsocialrelations,thepreceptsofhygiene,oreventhegeneraltheory[Lehre]of[howtoattain]happiness,indeednoteven—withthatgoalinmind—thetamingofourinclinationsandthesubjugationofouraffects.Foralloftheseartscontainonlyrulesofskill,whicharethereforeonlytechnicallypractical,forproducinganeffectthatispossibleaccordingtoconceptsofnatureaboutcausesandeffects;andsincetheseconceptsbelongtotheoreticalphilosophy,theyaresubjecttothosepreceptsasmerecorollariesoftheoreticalphilosophy(i.e.,ofnaturalscience),andsocannotclaimaplaceinaspecial[theexerciseof]thecausalityisaconceptofnature,thentheprincipleswillbetechnicallypractical;butifitisaconceptoffreedom,thentheprincipleswillbemorallypractical.Andsincethedivisionofarationalscience[philosophycalledpractical.Morallypracticalprecepts,ontheotherhand,whicharebasedentirelyontheconceptoffreedom,allnaturalbasesdeterminingthewillbeingexcluded,formaveryspecialkindofprecepts.Justastherulesthatnatureobeysarecalledlawssimply,sotooarethese;but,unlikelawsofnature,practicallawsdonotrestonsensibleconditionsbutrestonasupersensibleprinciple;[hence]theyrequirejustforthemselvesanotherpartofphilosophy,alongsidethetheoreticalone,tobecalledpracticalphilosophy.Whattheaboveshowsisthatasetofpracticalpreceptsprovidedbyphilosophycannotformaspecialpartofphilosophy,placedalongsidethetheoreticalpart,merelybecausetheyarepractical;fortheycouldbepracticaleveniftheirprinciples(astechnicallypracticalrules)weretakenentirelyfromourtheoreticalcognitionofnature.Rather,theyformsuchaspecialpartwhenandiftheirprincipleisinnowayborrowedfromtheconceptofnature,whichisalwaysconditionedbythesensible,butrestsonthesupersensiblethattheconceptoffreedomaloneenablesustoknow[kennbar]throughformallaws,sothatthesepreceptsaremorallypractical,i.e.,theyarenotjustpreceptsandrulesforachievingthisorthatintention,butarelawsthatdonotrefertoanypurposesorintentionswealreadyhave.\"
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