数学与金融经典教材（影印版）·激励理论：委托代理模型

图书标准信息

• 作者 [美]拉奉特（Laffont J.J.） 著
• 出版社 世界图书出版公司
• 出版时间 2013-01
• 版次 1
• ISBN 9787510050503
• 定价 89.00元
• 装帧 平装
• 开本 16开
• 纸张 胶版纸
• 页数 421页
• 正文语种 英语

【内容简介】

　　Thebookallowsfortwolevelsofreading.Certainsectionsinsomechaptersaremarkedwithastartotherightofthesectionhead.Afirstreadingshouldconcentrateonthenon-starredsections.Thesesectionsareaccessibletoreaderswhohaveasimpleknowledgeofmaximizationwithinequalityconstraints.Mostessentialeconomiclessonscanbeunderstoodfromthisfirstlevelofreading.Cov-eringthestarredsectionswillenablesmdentstomanipulatetheconceptsforbetterassimilationandwillputthemincontactwiththeadvancedtopicsofthefield.

【目录】

Foreword
Introduction
1IncentivesinEconomic'Thought
1.1AdamSmithandIncentiveContractsinAgriculture
1.2ChesterBarnardandIncentivesinManagement
1.3Hume,Wicksell,Croves:TheFree-RiderProblem
1.4Borda,Bowen,Vickrey:IncentivesinVoting
1.5L60nWalrasandtheRegulationofNaturalMonopolies
1.6Knight,Arrow,Pauly:IncentivesinInsurance
1.7Sidgwick,Vickrey,Mirrlees:RedistributionandIncentives
1.8Dupuit,Edgeworth,Pigou:PriceDiscrimination
1.9IncentivesinPlaiinedEconomies
1.10LeonidHurwiczandMechanismDesign
1.11Auctions

2TheRentExtraction-EfficiencyTrade-Off
2.1TheBasicModel
2.2TheCompleteInformationOptimalContract
2.3IncentiveFeasibleMenuofContracts
2.4InformationRents
2.5TheOptunizationProgramofthePrincipaJ
2.6TheRentExtraction-EfficiencyTrade-Off
2.7TheTheoryoftheFirmUnderAsymmetricInformation
2.8AsymmetricInformationandMarginalCostPricing
2.9TheRevelationPrinciple
2.10AMoreGeneralUtilityFunctionfortheAgent
2.11ExAnteversusExPostParticipationConstraints
2.12Commitment
2.13StochasticMechanisms
2.14InformativeSignalstoImproveContracting
2.15ContractTheoryatWork
Appendix

3IncentiveandParticipationConstraintswithAdverseSelection
3.1MorethanTwoTypes
3.2MultidimensionalAsymmetricInformation
3.3Type-DependentParticipationConstraintand
CountervailingIncentives
3.4RandomParticipationConstraint
3.5LimitedLiability
3.6AuditMechanismsandCostlyStateVerification
3.7RedistributiveConcernsandtheEfficiency-EquityTrade-off
Appendices

4MoralHazard:TheBasicTrade-Offs
4.1TheModel
4.2RiskNeutralityandFirst-BestImplementation
……
5IncentiveandParticipationConstraintswithMoralHazard
6Nonverifiability
7MixedModels
8DynamicsunderFullCommitment
9LimitsandExtensions

References
AuthorIndex
SubjectIndex