联邦党人文集（上下)

图书标准信息

• 作者 詹姆斯·麦迪逊 著；金莉 编；亚历山大·汉密尔顿；约翰·杰伊；杨慧林
• 出版社 中国人民大学出版社
• 出版时间 2013-04
• 版次 1
• ISBN 9787300172262
• 定价 49.00元
• 装帧 平装
• 开本 32开
• 纸张 胶版纸
• 页数 698页
• 字数 99999千字

【内容简介】

　　《世界大师原典文库：联邦党人文集（中文导读插图版）（套装上下册）》是亚历山大·汉密尔顿、约翰·杰伊、和詹姆斯·麦迪逊三人为争取批准新宪法在纽约报刊上共以“普布利乌斯”为笔名而发表的一系列的论文文集。1787年费城举行的全国代表会议制定了一部新宪法。但是，在各州的批准过程中，对新宪法有两种截然相反的意见：一种拥护，一种反对。因此就发生了美国历史上一场最激烈的论战。《世界大师原典文库：联邦党人文集（中文导读插图版）（套装上下册）》就是这次论战的产物。

【作者简介】

　　亚历山大·汉密尔顿（1757-1804），美国开国元勋之一，宪法起草人之一，财经专家，美国第一任财政部长。是美国政党制度的创建者，在美国金融、财政和工业发展史上占有重要地位。因政党相争而决斗丧生。2006年，汉密尔顿被美国的权威期刊《大西洋月刊》评为影响美国的100位人物第5名。

　　

　　约翰·杰伊（1745-1829），美国政治家、革命家、外交家和法学家。他与本杰明·富兰克林和约翰·亚当斯一同出使法国、与亚历山大·汉密尔顿和詹姆斯·麦迪逊一起撰写了《联邦党人文集》。他还曾任美国最高法院法官，从1789年到1795年他出任美国首席大法官。1829年逝世于纽约威切斯特郡。

　　

　　詹姆斯·麦迪逊（1751-1836），美国第四任总统。他担任总统期间曾领导进行第二次美英战争，保卫了美国的共和制度，为美国赢得彻底独立建立了功绩。他在1776年参加弗吉尼亚宪法的制定，是弗吉尼亚会议的领导人。他还是出席大陆会议的代表、制宪会议的主要人物、北部联邦党人文件的起草人之一、众议院议员、民主共和党的组织者。

【目录】

FEDERALISTNo.1GeneralIntroduction

FEDERALISTNo.2ConcerningDangersfromForeignForceandInfluence

FEDERALISTNo.3TheSameSubjectContinued

FEDERALISTNo.4TheSameSubjectContinued

FEDERALISTNo.5TheSameSubjectContinued

FEDERALISTNo.6ConcerningDangersfromDissensionsBetweentheStates

FEDERALISTNo.7TheSameSubjectContinued

FEDERALISTNo.8TheConsequencesofHostilitiesBetweentheStates

FEDERALISTNo.9TheUnionasaSafeguardAgainstDomesticFactionandInsurrection

FEDERALISTNo.10TheSameSubjectContinued

FEDERALISTNo.11TheUtilityoftheUnioninRespecttoCommercialRelationsandaNavy

FEDERALISTNo.12TheUtilityoftheUnioninRespecttoRevenue

FEDERALISTNo.13AdvantageoftheUnioninRespecttoEconomyinGovernment

FEDERALISTNo.14ObjectionstotheProposedConstitutionfromExtentofTerritoryAnswered

FEDERALISTNo.15TheInsufficiencyofthePresentConfederationtoPreservetheUnion

FEDERALISTNo.16TheSameSubjectContinued

FEDERALISTNo.17TheSameSubjectContinued

FEDERALISTNo.18TheSameSubjectContinued

FEDERALISTNo.19TheSameSubjectContinued

FEDERALISTNo.20TheSameSubjectContinued

FEDERALISTNo.21OtherDefectsofthePresentConfederation

FEDERALISTNo.22TheSameSubjectContinued

FEDERALISTNo.23TheNecessityofaGovernmentasEnergeticastheOneProposedtothePreservationoftheUnion

FEDERALISTNo.24ThePowersNecessarytotheCommonDefenseFurtherConsidered

FEDERALISTNo.25TheSameSubjectContinued

FEDERALISTNo.26TheIdeaofRestrainingtheLegislativeAuthorityinRegardtotheCommonDefenseConsidered

FEDERALISTNo.27TheSameSubjectContinued

FEDERALISTNo.28TheSameSubjectContinued

FEDERALISTNo.29ConcerningtheMilitia

FEDERALISTNo.30ConcerningtheGeneralPowerofTaxation

FEDERALISTNo.31TheSameSubjectContinued

FEDERALISTNo.32TheSameSubjectContinued

FEDERALISTNo.33TheSameSubjectContinued

FEDERALISTNo.34TheSameSubjectContinued

FEDERALISTNo.35TheSameSubjectContinued

FEDERALISTNo.36TheSameSubjectContinued

FEDERALISTNo.37ConcerningtheDifficultiesoftheConventioninDevisingaProperFormofGovernment

FEDERALISTNo.38TheSameSubjectContinued,andtheIncoherenceoftheObjectionstotheNewPlanExposed

FEDERALISTNo.39TheConformityofthePlanttoRepublicanPrinciples

FEDERALISTNo.40OnthePowersoftheConventiontoFormaMixedGovernmentExaminedandSustained

FEDERALISTNo.41GeneralViewofthePowersConferredbytheConstitution

FEDERALISTNo.42ThePowersConferredbytheConstitutionFurtherConsidered

FEDERALISTNo.43TheSameSubjectContinued

FEDERALISTNo.44RestrictionsontheAuthorityoftheSeveralStates

FEDERALISTNo.45TheAllegedDangerfromthePowersoftheUniontotheStateGovernmentsConsidered

FEDERALISTNo.46TheInfluenceoftheStateandFederalGovernmentsCompared

FEDERALISTNo.47TheParticularStructureoftheNewGovernmentandtheDistributionofPowerAmongItsDifferentParts

FEDERALISTNo.48TheseDepartmentsShouldNotBeSoFarSeparatedastoHaveNoConstitutionalControloverEachOther

FEDERALISTNo.49MethodofGuardingAgainsttheEncroachmentsofAnyOneDepartmentofGovernmentbyAppealingtothePeopleThroughaConvention

FEDERALISTNo.50PeriodicalAppealstothePeopleConsidered

FEDERALISTNo.51TheStructureoftheGovernmentMustFurnishtheProperChecksandBalancesBetweentheDifferentDepartments

FEDERALISTNo.52TheHouseofRepresentatives

FEDERALISTNo.53TheSameSubjectContinued

FEDERALISTNo.54TheApportionmentofMembersAmongtheStates

FEDERALISTNo.55TheTotalNumberoftheHouseofRepresentatives

FEDERALISTNo.56TheSameSubjectContinued

FEDERALISTNo.57TheAllegedTendencyoftheNewPlantoElevatetheFewattheExpenseoftheManyConsideredinConnectionwithRepresentation

FEDERALISTNo.58ObjectionThattheNumberofMembersWillNotBeAugmentedastheProgressofPopulationDemandsConsidered

FEDERALISTNo.59ConcerningthePowerofCongresstoRegulatetheElectionofMembers

FEDERALISTNo.60TheSameSubjectContinued

FEDERALISTNo.61TheSameSubjectContinued

FEDERALISTNo.62TheSenate

FEDERALISTNo.63TheSenateContinued

FEDERALISTNo.64ThePowersoftheSenate

FEDERALISTNo.65ThePowersoftheSenateContinued

FEDERALISTNo.66ObjectionstothePoweroftheSenatetoSetasaCourtforImpeachmentsFurtherConsidered

FEDERALISTNo.67TheExecutiveDepartment

FEDERALISTNo.68TheModeofElectingthePresident

FEDERALISTNo.69TheRealCharacteroftheExecutive

FEDERALISTNo.70TheExecutiveDepartmentFurtherConsidered

FEDERALISTNo.71TheDurationinOfficeoftheExecutive

FEDERALISTNo.72TheSameSubjectContinued,andRe-EligibilityoftheExecutiveConsidered

FEDERALISTNo.73TheProvisionfortheSupportoftheExecutive,andtheVetoPower

FEDERALISTNo.74TheCommandoftheMilitaryandNavalForces,andthePardoningPoweroftheExecutive

FEDERALISTNo.75TheTreaty-MakingPoweroftheExecutive

FEDERALISTNo.76TheAppointingPoweroftheExecutive

FEDERALISTNo.77TheAppointingPowerContinuedandOtherPowersoftheExecutiveConsidered

FEDERALISTNo.78TheJudiciaryDepartment

FEDERALISTNo.79TheJudiciaryContinued

FEDERALISTNo.80ThePowersoftheJudiciary

FEDERALISTNo.81TheJudiciaryContinued,andtheDistributionoftheJudicialAuthority

FEDERALISTNo.82TheJudiciaryContinued

FEDERALISTNo.83TheJudiciaryContinuedinRelationtoTrialbyJury

FEDERALISTNo.84CertainGeneralandMiscellaneousObjectionstotheConstitutionConsideredandAnswered

FEDERALISTNo.85ConcludingRemarks

Appendixex

TheDeclarationofIndependence

TheArticlesofConfederation

TheConstitutionofTheUnitedStatesofAmerica