Epistemic Angst 认知焦虑 激进的怀疑主义和我们无根据的信任 哲学 Duncan Pritchard
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作者Duncan Pritchard
出版社Princeton University Press
ISBN9780691183435
出版时间2013-03
装帧平装
定价298元
货号YB-66407
上书时间2024-07-02
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Epistemic Angst offers a completely new solution to the ancient philosophical problem of radical skepticism—the challenge of explaining how it is possible to have knowledge of a world external to us. Duncan Pritchard argues that the key to resolving this puzzle is to realize that it is composed of two logically distinct problems, each requiring its own solution. He then puts forward solutions to both problems. To that end, he offers a new reading of Wittgenstein's account of the structure of rational evaluation and demonstrates how this provides an elegant solution to one aspect of the skeptical problem. Pritchard also revisits the epistemological disjunctivist proposal that he developed in previous work and shows how it can effectively handle the other aspect of the problem. Finally, he argues that these two antiskeptical positions, while superficially in tension with each other, are not only compatible but also mutually supporting. The result is a comprehensive and distinctive resolution to the problem of radical skepticism, one that challenges many assumptions in contemporary epistemology. 认知焦虑为激进怀疑主义的古老哲学问题提供了一个全新的解决方案——解释如何可能获得关于我们外部世界的知识的挑战。邓肯·普里查德认为，解决这个难题的关键是要认识到它是由两个逻辑上不同的问题组成的，每个问题都需要自己的解决方案。然后他提出了这两个问题的解决方案。为此，他对维特根斯坦对理性评价结构的解释进行了新的解读，并展示了它如何为怀疑问题的一个方面提供了一种优雅的解决方案。普里查德还重新审视了他在之前的工作中提出的认识论析取主义提议，并展示了它如何有效地处理问题的其他方面。*后，他认为这两种反怀疑立场虽然表面上彼此紧张，但实际上不仅兼容而且相互支持。其结果是对激进怀疑主义问题的全面而独特的解决，这一问题挑战了当代认识论中的许多假设。
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