目录 卷 论行为的适宜性/Part One Of the Propriety of Action篇 论适宜性/SectionⅠ Of the Sense of Propriety2章 论同情/Chapter 1 Of Sympathy3第二章 论相互同情的快乐/Chapter 2 Of the Pleasure of mutual Sympathy10第三章 论比较他人的感情与我们的感情是否一致来判断他人感情是否适宜的方式/Chapter 3 Of the manner in which we judge of the propriety or impropriety of the Affections of other Men, by their concord or dissonance with our own14第四章 续前章/Chapter 4 The same subject continued19第五章 论亲切的和值得尊敬的美德/Chapter 5 Of the amiable and respectable virtues26第二篇 论各种适宜的激情程度/Section Ⅱ Of the Degrees of the different Passions which are consistent with Propriety31引言/Introduction32章 论源于身体的激情/Chapter 1 Of the Passions which take their origin from the body34第二章 论源于某种特殊倾向或想象习惯的激情/Chapter 2 Of those Passions which take their origin from a particular turn or habit of the Imagination40第三章 论不友好的激情/Chapter 3 Of the unsocial Passions45第四章 论友好的激情/Chapter 4 Of the social Passions52第五章 论自私的激情/Chapter 5 Of the selfish Passions55第三篇 论繁荣和灾祸对人们判断行为是否适宜所产生的影响;以及为什么在一种情形下比在另一种情况下更容易获得人们的认可/Section Ⅲ Of the Effects of Prosperity and Adversity upon the Judgment of Mankind with regard to the Propriety of Action; and why it is more easy to obtain their Approbation in the one state than in the other60章 虽然我们对悲伤的同情一般比对快乐的同情更为强烈,但是它通常远没有主要当事人自然感受到的强烈/Chapter 1 That though our sympathy with sorrow is generally a more lively sensation than our sympathy with joy, it commonly falls much more short of the violence of what is naturally felt by the person principally concerned61第二章 论野心的起源和社会阶层的区别/Chapter 2 Of the origin of Ambition, and of the distinction of Ranks70第三章 论源于钦佩富人和大人物、轻视或忽视穷人和小人物的道德情操败坏/Chapter 3 Of the corruption of our moral sentiments, which is occasioned by this disposition to admire the rich and the great, and to despise or neglect persons of poor and mean condition83第二卷 论优、缺点;报答与惩处的对象/Part Two Of Merit and Demerit; or of the Objects of Reward and Punishment篇 论对优点和缺点的感觉/Section Ⅰ Of the Sense of Merit and Demerit92引言/Introduction93章 任何适宜的感激对象的行为显然应该得到报答;同样,任何适宜的愤恨对象的行为显然应该受到惩罚95Chapter 1 That whatever appears to be the proper object of gratitude appears to deserve reward; and that, in the same manner, whatever appears to be the proper object of resentment, appears to deserve punishment95第二章 论适当的感激对象和适当的愤恨对象/Chapter 2 Of the proper objects of gratitude and resentment99第三章 不认可施恩者的行为,就几乎不会同情受益者的感激;相反,对损人者的动机表示认同,对受难者的愤恨就不会有一点同情/Chapter 3 That where there is no approbation of the conduct of the person who confers the benefit, there is little sympathy with the gratitude of him who receives it: and that, on the contrary, where there is no disapprobation of the motives of the person who does the mischief, there is no sort of sympathy with the resentment of him who suffers it103第四章 对前几章的概括/Chapter 4 Recapitulation of the foregoing chapters106第五章 对优点和缺点感觉的分析/Chapter 5 The analysis of the sense of Merit and Demerit108第二篇 论正义和仁慈/Section two Of Justice and Beneficence115章 两种美德的比较/Chapter 1 Comparison of those two virtues116第二章 论对正义、懊悔的感觉,兼论对优点的意识/Chapter 2 Of the sense of Justice, of Remorse, and of the consciousness of Merit122第三章 论这种天性构成的效用/Chapter 3 Of the utility of this constitution of Nature127第三篇 关于行为的优点或缺点,论命运对人类情感的影响Section Ⅲ Of the Influence of Fortune upon the Sentiments of Mankind, with regard to the Merit or Demerit of Actions136引言/Introduction137章 论这种命运产生影响的原因/Chapter 1 Of the causes of this Influence of Fortune140第二章 论这种命运产生影响的程度/Chapter 2 Of the extent of this Influence of Fortune145第三章 论这种无规律情感变化的最终原因/Chapter 3 Of the final cause of this Irregularity of Sentiments155第三卷 论评判自己的情感和行为的基础,兼论责任感/Part Three Of the Foundation of our Judgments concerning our own Sentiments and Conduct, and of the Sense of Duty章 论自我认同和不认同的原则/Chapter 1 Of the Principle of Self-approbation and of Self-disapprobation162第二章 论对赞扬和值得赞扬的喜欢;兼论对责备和该受责备的恐惧/Chapter 2 Of the love of Praise, and of that of Praise-worthiness; and of the dread of Blame, and of that of Blame-worthiness167第三章 论良心的威信和影响/Chapter 3 Of the Influence and Authority of Conscience190第四章 论自欺欺人的本性,兼论一般准则的起源和用途/Chapter 4 Of the Nature of Self-deceit, and of the origin and Use of general Rules217第五章 论道德的通常规则的影响和威信,以及它们被公正地看作神的法则/Chapter 5 Of the influence and authority of the general Rules of Morality, and that they are justly regarded as the Laws of the Deity224第六章 在何种情况下,责任感应该成为人们行为的准则;在何种情况下,它应该同其他动机一起发生作用/Chapter 6 In what cases the Sense of Duty ought to be the sole principle of our conduct; and in what cases it ought to concur with other motives237第四卷 论效用对认同情感的作用/Part Four Of the Effect of Utility upon the Sentiment of Approbation章 论效用的表现赋予所有艺术作品的美,兼论这种美所具有的广泛影响250Chapter 1 Of the beauty which the appearance of Utility bestows upon all the productions of Art, and of the extensive influence of this species of Beauty250第二章 论效用的表现赋予人的行为和品格的美,以及关于这种美的概念可能在何种程度上被看成一种原始的认同原则261Chapter 2 Of the beauty which the appearance of Utility bestows upon the characters and actions of men; and how far the perception of thieauty may be regarded as one of the original principles of approbation261第五卷 习惯和风气对认同的与不认同的道德情操的影响/Part Five Of the Influence of Custom and Fashion upon the Sentiments of Moral Approbation and Disapprobation章 论习惯和风气施加于人们对美和丑看法的影响/Chapter 1 Of the Influence of Custom and Fashion upon our notions of Beauty and Deformity272第二章 论习惯和风气对道德情感的影响/Chapter 2 Of the Influence of Custom and Fashion upon Moral Sentiments281第六卷 论美德的品格/Part Six Of the Character of Virtue引言/Introduction298篇 论个人的品格,就它对其幸福的影响而言;或论谨慎/SECTION Ⅰ Of the Character of the Individual, so far as it affects his own Happiness; or of Prudence299第二篇 论个人的品格,就它对其他人幸福的影响/SECTION Ⅱ Of the Character of the Individual, so far as it can affect the Happiness of other People308引言/Introduction309章 论天性致使个人成为我们关心和注意的对象所依据的次序/Chapter 1 Of the Order in which Individuals are recommended by Nature to our Care and Attention311第二章 论天性使社会团体成为人们行善对象的次序/Chapter 2 Of the Order in which societies are by Nature recommended to our Beneficence324第三章 论世界性的行善/Chapter 3 Of universal Benevolence334第三篇 论自我支配/SECTION Ⅲ Of Self-command338第六卷的结论/Conclusion of the Sixth Part371第七卷 论道德的哲学体系/Part Seven Of Systems of Moral Philosophy篇 论应当在道德情感理论中考虑的问题/SECTION Ⅰ Of the Questions which ought to be examined in a Theory of Moral Sentiments376第二篇 论已对美德的本质做出的各种说明/SECTION Ⅱ Of the different Accounts which have been given of the Nature of Virtue379引言/Introduction380章 论认为美德存在于适宜性之中的那些体系/Chapter 1 Of those Systems which make Virtue consist in Propriety382第二章 论认为美德存在于谨慎之中的那些体系/Chapter 2 Of those Systems which make Virtue consist in Prudence413第三章 论认为美德存在于善行之中的那些体系/Chapter 3 Of those Systems which make Virtue consist in Benevolence421第四章 论放肆的体系/Chapter 4 Of licentious Systems430第三篇 论已经形成的有关认同原则的各种体系/SECTION Ⅲ Of the different Systems which have been formed concerning the Principle of Approbation441引言/Introduction442章 论从自爱推断出认同原则的那些体系/Chapter 1 Of those Systems which deduce the Principle of Approbation from self-love444第二章 论把理性看成认同原则的根源的那些体系/Chapter 2 Of those Systems which make Reason the Principle of Approbation448第三章 论把情感看成认同原则的根源的那些体系/Chapter 3 Of those Systems which make Sentiment the Principle of Approbation453第四篇 论不同的作者论述道德实践规则的方式/SECTION Ⅳ Of the Manner in which different Authors have treated of the practical Rules of Morality462 作者介绍 亚当·斯密(Adam Smith,1723-1790),英国古典政治经济学家、哲学家、现代西方经济学之父。亚当·斯密1723年6月5日出生于苏格兰,青年时就读于牛津大学国; 1748-1751,任爱丁堡大学讲师,讲授经济学;1751-1764年,任格拉斯哥大学哲学教授,1759年出版了他的巨著 序言
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