因为《马关条约》赔款，清政府先后于1895与1898两次通过汇丰银行向英德借款。 这批资料中绝大部分信件的收件人是汇丰银行汉堡分行经理JULIUS BRUSSEL（此人是汇丰银行与德国银行关键联络人）。主要包括汇丰银行亚洲与中国分行总裁嘉谟伦（Sir Ewen CAMERON 1841/1908）、其后任TOWNSEND、Sir Charles Stewart ADDIS(1861/1945)等人与德意志银行前身Deutsche Disconto Gesellschaft的总裁HANSEMANN(1826/1903)以及德华银行（DEUTSCH-ASIATISCHE BANK）给他的亲笔、打印信，誊写复印件与电报。中间夹杂包括汇丰银行北京分行总经理HILLIER熙礼尔(1857/1924)、中国海关总税务司Sir Robert Hart (1835/1911) 赫德的一些信件以及发行债券的资料。时间跨度为1896年至1905年。此乃清代金融史的极其珍贵的外文第一手资料，国内公私收藏绝无仅有！
第一册 China Loan Letters 1 Jan . 1896 - 30.06.1896。 每册约250份文件。 第二册 China Loan Letters 1 July 1896 - 30 June 1897。 第三册 China Loan Letters 1 july 1897 - 31 Dec. 1897。 第四册 China Loan Letters 1/1/1898 - 7/9/1898 第五册 China Loan letters 31/8/1898 - 31712/1898 第六册 China Loan Letters 1899 第七册 China Loan letters 1900
第八册 China Loan Telegrams 18/8/1896-29/12/1898 第九册 China Loan Telegrams 4/3/1897-10/12/1898
第十册 Letters re China Railways, Loans 18 Jan. 1900 - 12 October 1901 第十一册 China Loans re Railways from 13 Oct. 1901 to 18 April 1903 第十二册 China Railways and Loans from 18th April to 25th March 1905 第十三册 China Railways and Loans from 27 March to 27 May 1908
第十四册 Letters re China Railways and Loans Jan 1901 - Dec. 1902 第十五册 Letters re China Railways and Loans Jan./Dec. 1903 第十六册 Letters re China Railways and Loans 1904 第十七册 Letters re China Railways and Loans 1905
HONG KONG SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION. DISCONTO GESELLSCHAFT. Archive of Correspondence with the Disconto Company relating to Loans for Railway Construction in China
17 volumes containing thousands of autograph letters, typescripts, carbon copies and telegrams. China Loan Letters (Jan. 1896 - Dec. 1905 11 vols.) - Carbon copies of Letters re. China Railways and Loans (Jan. 1900 - May 1908, 4 vols.) - Chinese Loan Telegrams (1896-1898, 2 vols.). Text largely in English and German, a few in French. Small folio. Bound in conteporary maroon cloth folders. Occasional minor wear, but overall in very good condition, Brussels, Hamburg, Peking etc. 1896-1906.
A substial archive relating to Private and Government loans to China around the turn of the century. The present files relate largely to the work of Julius Brüssel who was the Director of HSBC in Hamburg and a key figure in the negotiations between his bank, the Germany Dosonto Gesellschaft (a forerunner organiszation of Deutsche Bank), and the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank. They They initially formed a consortium in order to raise a 16 million Pound loan for the Chinese Government in order to pay an indemnity demanded by the Japanese Government after the first Sino-Japanese War of 1895. This was the first time that a German and British bank co-operated successfully for a loan agreement in China. On the Chinese side the negotiations were conducted with the Tsungli yamen as well as local officials. After 1897 both banks continued negotiations over loan agreements for the construction of the Tientsin-Yangtse railway, one of the most significant railway projects in China at that time. However these negotiations took place against a background of German and British tussling over economic and political 'spheres of influence'. China on the other hand tried to play both nations against each other while at the same time preventing further erosion of power and fragmentation of their country. They were in the uneviable position of having to struggle against foreign powers (on whose loans they depended) as well as their own Qing government whose unwillingness to confront the new political realities has exposed their internal contradictions and weakness. Important correspondents include: Sir Ewen Cameron (1841-19111, worked for HSBC from 1867-1905), his successor A. M. Townsend (active from 1866-1911), Sir Charles Stewart Addis (1861-1945, working for HSBC in Asia since 1883) as well as Adolph von Hansemann (1826-1903, Director of the Disconto-Gesellschaft from 1864-1903), Sir Robert Hart (1835-1911) of the Imperial Chinese Customs Service and E. G. Hillier (1857-1924) of HSBC Peking. Hillier's contribution to negotiations is remarkabel: Fluent in Chinese he had joined HSBC in 1883 and moved to Peking in 1885 where he set up the first foreign bank in the capital. His language ability made him popular with Chinese officials and he war clearly a perceptive and sympathetic negotiator. His letters are frank and betray an impressive grasp of the characters and their political allegiances. Much of the archive relates to raising funds and underwriting loans to the Chinese Government, their timing, interest rates, associated costs and the letters throw much light on the drama of these deals. There is talk of distrust between both the European nations as well as between the individulas involved in these negotiations, a heady mix of commercial and national interests, political intrigue, stereopypes, and ambition. For exemple, in early August 1897 the slide of the silver price meant that China's ability to fund itself had descreased by around 21%. The German Disconto-Gesellschaft was this as a serious obstacle to continuing the negotiations with the Chinese. On the August 19th it is reported that Sheng （盛宣怀）, the director of Chinese railways, had signed a preliminary contract over the loan of 16,000.000 Pound with the Hooley-Jameson syndicate but there are doubts that Hooley could in fact raise the money. Both the HSBC and the DG correspodents dismiss this deal as tactical nisinformation by the Chinese government. By Oct 12th there are clear indications that the Hooley-syndicate is unable to raise the money from either French, Russian or any other banks. On the same day Nobel writes: "It is kind of Li Hung Chang （李鸿章）to say he is willing to negotiate with us on the basis of the Hooley agreement - I dare say he is!" and on the following day this is confirmed: "I said that H.E. was aware we could not float a Loan on the security of the Salt & Likin taxes unless they were placed unter foreign control. He repliend that Li had said that this was impracticable, what else would do?" On Oct 15th the director of the Disconto-Gesellschaft writes (in translation): "There is no need for us to act in a hurry... the Chinese Govenment will have to take steps to restructure their financial system ... foremost is the revision of foreign maritime customs duties and the will have to regulate their intermal taxis (likin) in a way that will make it easier for European business to gain access to their markets..." On Nov 25th Hillier writes from Peking: "I therefore think should do everything possible to meet Li on his own ground on which he is likely now to make every effort to satisfy our requirments, much more so than any new negotiator, like Chang Yin-huan, into whose hands the business would be transferred: the advantage of Chang as a negotiator would be that he is considerably under the influnece of Sir claude Macdonald, but he is also under that of Sir Robert Hart, who although he would not probably be able to get for us better security that tnow under consideration, would be likely, fo his own purpose, to try to squeeze us in the price as he hase done once before---" etc. etc. The Anglo-German group finally managed to sign a deal for 12,000,000 Pound on Januar 1898.
This is an extraordinary archive that sheds much light on the individual national, and historical circumstances of financial dealings with China around the turn of the century.